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INTRODUCTION
The development and publication of any law of war manual is not easy. This is
particularly so when the focus is on an area such as air and missile warfare that
involves relatively new technology that is the subject of few international treaties and
does not always easily fit within the legal traditions that emerge from many centuries
of conflicts on the land and sea domains.1 Moreover, when it involves a means and
method of warfare that largely is dominated by a few countries, the challenge is even
more daunting to reconcile the legitimate concerns of the leading aviation powers
with those of the rest of the family of nations.
All of this makes the development of the Manual on International Law
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (AMW Manual)2 such a towering
achievement. Fortunately, it was shepherded to success by an individual of

* Major General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1975; B.A., St.
Joseph’s University, 1972. Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, 2006–10. Visiting Professor
and Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University School of Law.
1. See generally Javier Guisández Gómez, The Law of Air Warfare, 323 INT’L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS (1998), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jpcl.htm.
2. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009), available at http://ihlresearch
.org/amw/HPCR%20Manual.pdf [hereinafter AMW MANUAL].
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Brobdingnagian intellect, energy, patience, and determination: Professor Claude
Bruderlein, the director of Harvard’s Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research, who was central to the success of the effort. Undoubtedly, he would be
the first to insist on crediting Professor Yoram Dinstein, whose significance to this
project cannot be overstated. Still, the fact that this project overcame so many
obstacles is much due to Professor Bruderlein’s tireless efforts.
The publication of the AMW Manual is extremely timely, coming as it does at a
time in history when air warfare is increasingly becoming the weaponry of choice to
battle transnational terrorists, especially in remote locations. That said, any
assessment of the role of law of war manuals, to include the AMW Manual, must
acknowledge the heritage of the Lieber Code,3 which was produced long before
powered aircraft or missiles became commonplace instruments of war. Many
authorities consider this Civil War-era document the “seminal step” in the “detailed
codification and exposition of the laws of war.”4 It was, historians say, “the first
instance in western history in which the government of a sovereign nation established
formal guidelines for its army’s conduct toward its enemies.”5 Since the Lieber Code,
a number of manuals of various styles have been produced.
Hays Parks, speaking in November 2010 about the drafting of the as yet
unreleased U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual (DoD Manual),
detailed the role of law of war manuals in the development of the modern law of
armed conflict (LOAC).6 He, too, noted the importance of the Lieber Code, but also
listed the 1914 edition of the U.S. War Department’s Rules of Land Warfare as well
as other American and foreign manuals as examples of the genre.7 From his study,
Parks, who is the principal drafter of the forthcoming DoD Manual, concludes that
the best manuals “explain the law with State practice examples,” and that is the style
he chose for the DoD Manual.8
Because of this different approach, the DoD Manual is expected to weigh in at
over 1,000 pages and be documented with more than 3,000 footnotes.9 According to
Parks, this more detailed explication is intended to add perspective to the rules,
complete with illustrations, so that practitioners in particular will understand the
intended context of the law and policy pronouncements the DoD Manual is expected
to contain.10 Again, Parks’ view is that “providing a treaty text without explanation,

3. U.S. War Dep’t, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United states in the Field, Gen.
Orders No. 100 (1863), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument.
4. STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 186 (2005).
5. Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants, and
Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93, 99 (Christopher H. Schroeder &
Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (quoting RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE & THE LAW OF
WAR 1–2 (1983)).
6. W. Hays Parks, Former Senior Assoc. Deputy Counsel, Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Def., National
Security Law in Practice: The Department of Defense Law of War Manual, Speech at the ABA Standing
Committee on Law and National Security Breakfast Series 1–7 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/natsecurity/hays_parks_speech11082010.authcheck
dam.pdf.
7. Id. at 1.
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 8.
10. W. Hays Parks, Former Senior Assoc. Deputy Counsel, Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Def., U.S. and The
Laws of War, Summary of the International Law Discussion Group Meeting Held at Chatham House 16
(Feb. 21, 2011), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International
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clarification, elaboration, or evidence of State practice (other than similar manuals),
has resulted in lawyers, military and civilian, incorrectly viewing law of war treaties
as the sole source for the law.”11
The Commentary to the AMW Manual serves something of a similar purpose.12
For U.S. government practitioners, this is, however, somewhat problematic—as any
such document built upon the unofficial contributions of experts from a variety of
nations is likely to be. U.S. government military operations are often dominated by
American policy considerations, to include interpretations of international law that
may not be shared by other nations. As will be discussed in more detail below, this is
especially so with respect to customary international law that is reflected in both the
AMW Manual and its Commentary.
This short essay is intended to provide some perspectives on the role the AMW
Manual can play in the future. It aims to provide special emphasis on the practical
issues associated with air and missile operations. It assesses the potential of the
manual to turn the norms it promotes into accepted practice among nations, if not
into customary international law.

I.

THE AMW MANUAL’S EDUCATIVE FUNCTION

Beyond its potential as a norm-setter in international law, the AMW Manual
could provide an enormous service by helping to teach not just military audiences but
also the public at large the fundamentals of the law applicable to air and missile
warfare. Education about the law applicable to these technologies is critical. In the
larger context, Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions already recognizes the
importance of efforts like the AMW Manual by calling upon the parties to
“encourage the study [of the Conventions] by the civilian population.”13
Though the United States is not a party to the Protocol,14 and it is doubtful that
this section would be considered customary international law, it nevertheless makes
practical sense. Why? Consider what Professors Michael Riesman and Chris T.
Antoniou contend in their 1994 book, The Laws of War: “In modern popular
democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of popular
support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy
the political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair,
inhumane, or iniquitous way.”15
%20Law/il210211summary.pdf.
11. Id. at 9.
12. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE
HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2010),
available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/Commentary%20on%20the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf; see also
AMW MANUAL, supra note 2, at iii (“[T]he Commentary clarifies the prominent legal interpretations and
indicates differing perspectives.”).
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 83, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
AP I].
14. See States Parties, Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
(June 8 1977), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P#ratif (last visited Jan. 14,
2012) (U.S. not included as a party).
15. W. MICHAEL RIESMAN & CHRIS T. ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR xxiv (1994).
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In order for “people” to make the appropriate judgment about the war’s
conduct, they need to understand exactly what the rules require. In this country,
however, there is considerable evidence that such an understanding is wanting. For
example, in a survey released in April 2011, the American Red Cross found that
“only 1 in 5 American youth is familiar with the Geneva Conventions”16 and just 44%
“believe that rules and laws governing actions in war are a good way to reduce
human suffering.”17 The only encouraging bit of news from this survey is that nearly
80% of youth recognize the need for better instruction on the law of war.18
Of course, the first priority has to be ensuring that those in the armed forces and
in the civilian defense establishment have a keen understanding of the law of war. In
this respect, the AMW Manual is especially well-suited because it clearly displays the
central concepts in a cogent and direct format; even the physical shape of the manual
is such that it easily slips into a cargo pocket of the military uniform. Attention to
such details is an important attribute of a document intended for real-world use.
Having the law readily accessible to those who must use it is necessary not just
to conform to moral and legal requirements, but also for practical, warfighting
reasons—particularly for modern democracies that honor the rule of law. Professor
William Eckhart points out that today’s adversaries aim to turn adherence to and
respect for the rule of law into vulnerabilities. He says:
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands
compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as
illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law
of war. Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von
Clausewitz would term our “center of gravity.”19
This is especially true in the kind of “irregular” conflicts that predominate
today.20 There is no question that many belligerents in such conflicts seek to gain an
advantage by portraying U.S. and other forces as violating the law of war, and thus
erode the popular support that Professors Riesman and Antoniou say democracies
need to sustain a warfighting effort.21 In particular, they try to show that the United
States and other nations with air war capabilities are violating the principle of
distinction—which Professor Gary Solis characterizes as “the most significant
battlefield concept a combatant must observe”22—by causing civilian casualties in
airstrikes.
16. Press Release, American Red Cross, Red Cross Survey Finds Young Americans Unaware of
Rules of War (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.94aae335470e233
f6cf911df43181aa0/?vgnextoid=801dbe9f0e64f210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD.
17. SURVEY ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AMERICAN RED CROSS 7 (March 2011),
available at http://www.redcross.org/www-files/Documents/pdf/international/IHL/IHLSurvey.pdf.
18. Id. at 14.
19. William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword, 4 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 431, 441 (2003).
20. The U.S. Department of Defense defines “irregular warfare” as a “violent struggle among state
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other
capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” Irregular Warfare, DICTIONARY
OF MILITARY TERMS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/i/19843.html.
21. RIESMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 15, at xxiv.
22. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 251 (2010). This legal principle requires
combatants to at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against the
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Candidly, they have enjoyed some success in Afghanistan, where “Afghan anger
over civilian casualties has been a long-standing issue . . . [and civilian casualties]
dominate Afghan critiques of international forces.”23 Unsurprisingly, Afghan
militants have made orchestrating such events a centerpiece of their strategy.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in 2009 that in Afghanistan,
“provoking or exploiting civilian casualties is a ‘princip[al] strategic tactic’ of the
Taliban.”24 This is particularly true with respect to airpower because it is a military
capability that they do not have and that they cannot defend against with the
weaponry they typically possess.25 Accordingly, they try to use the civilian casualty
issue as a way of limiting the use of airpower by creating political pressure, often by
exploiting popular misconceptions about the law.26
Defeating this tactic requires knowledge of the law of armed conflict as
applicable especially to air operations, and the AMW Manual can help provide that.
An absence of such knowledge and, indeed, understanding, can have profoundly
unproductive unintended consequences.27 A classic example is the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) clumsy efforts to offset Taliban manipulation of the
civilian casualty issue. NATO virtually invited problems when it announced in June
2007 that its forces “would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians
nearby.”28 Just a year later, a spokesman reiterated that “[i]f there is the likelihood
of even one civilian casualty, [NATO] will not strike, not even if we think Osama bin
Laden is down there.”29
The law of armed conflict—as is clear in the AMW Manual—certainly does
not demand such deference.30 “By creating restrictions beyond what [LOAC] would

latter. Id.
23. Erica Gaston, Karzai’s Civilian Casualty Ultimatum, FOREIGN POLICY (Jun. 2, 2011), http://afpak.
foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/02/karzais_civilian_casualties_ultimatum.
24. John J. Kruzel, U.S. Denies Using White Phosphorous in Afghanistan, Gates Pledges More
Investigation, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (May 11, 2009), http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=54294.
25. Cf. Erin Cunningham, Taliban Attack Highlights Its Growing Power, GLOBALPOST (Aug. 7,
2011),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/afghanistan/110807/taliban-attackhighlights-its-growing-power (explaining that the Taliban does not currently “maintain serious anti-aircraft
capabilities”).
26. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 121, 130
(2011) [hereinafter Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?] (“Exploiting civilian casualties, or more
academically, exploiting the adherence—or lack thereof—to the law of armed conflict axiom of distinction
has become the ‘principle strategic tactic’ of the Taliban much out of sheer necessity.” (quoting then-U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, quoted in John J. Kruzel, U.S. Denies Using White Phosphorous in
Afghanistan, Gates Pledges More Investigation, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE (May 11, 2009),
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54294)).
27. See id. at 133–35 (discussing the “unintended consequences” of restrictions the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization placed on airstrikes in response to concerns about civilian casualties).
28. Noor Kahn, Afghan Civilians Said Killed in Clash, WASH. POST (June 30, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/30/AR2007063000028.html (quoting Maj.
John Thomas, spokesman for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force).
29. Pamela Constable, NATO Hopes to Undercut Taliban with ‘Surge’ of Projects, WASH. POST (Sept.
27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/26/AR2008092603452_pf.html
(quoting Brig. Gen. Richard Blanchette, chief spokesman for NATO forces).
30. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Lawfare Amid Warfare, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2007), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/03/lawfare-amid-warfare/?page=1 (explaining that international law
recognizes “legitimate attacks on combatants” that may put civilians at risk).
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require, NATO’s pronouncements encourage the Taliban to shield themselves from
air attack by violating the law of armed conflict [by] embedding themselves among
civilians.”31 And this is exactly what has happened.32 Nevertheless, when he took
command of NATO operations in Afghanistan in June 2009, General Stanley A.
McChrystal put in place new restrictions on airstrikes in an effort to limit civilian
casualties, even though only a small percentage of the civilian losses were
attributable to airstrikes.33 Tragically, a year after the restrictive policy was put in
place, the United Nations (U.N.) reported that civilian casualties skyrocketed by
31%34 and Coalition military casualties reached an all-time high.35 The policy was a
stunning failure from every perspective as it had precisely the opposite effect than
that intended.
General David Petraeus replaced General McChrystal in June 2010 and put in
place rules that were more permissive36 and resulted in a 65% increase in the number
of airstrikes in his first year.37 Importantly, not only did the security situation in
Afghanistan improve, but civilian and military casualties also decreased remarkably.
Civilian casualties dropped from about 230 per month in 2010 to about 115 per
month in the first five months of 2011,38 85% of which were caused by the Taliban

31. Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, supra note 26, at 134.
32. Id. at 134 n.67.
33. See Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, Tactical Directive (2009), available in part at
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf (“The use of air-to-ground
munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and
prescribed conditions . . . .”); U.N. Assistance Mission to Afg., Afghanistan: Mid Year Bulletin on
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009, 10–11, (Jul. 31, 2009), http://unama.unmissions.org/
Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/09july31-UNAMA-HUMAN-RIGHTS-CIVILIAN-CASUALTIESMid-Year-2009-Bulletin.pdf (reporting that 20% of the total number of civilian casualties were caused by
airstrikes, which is lower than the previous year, in which airstrikes caused 26% of the total civilian
casualties).
34. Afghan Civilian Casualties Rise 31 Per Cent in First Six Months of 2010, U.N. ASSISTANCE
MISSION IN AFG. (Aug. 10, 2010), http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1741&ctl=Details
&mid=1882&ItemID=9955.
35. Elena Becatoros, 700 NATO Troops Killed in Afghanistan in 2011, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/28/700-nato-troops-killed-afghanistan-2010 (“This year is
by far the deadliest for the coalition . . . .”).
36. See Julian E. Barnes, Petraeus Resets Afghan Airstrike Rules, WSJ.COM (Aug. 1, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703314904575399770077260834.html (“describing General
Petraeus’ easing of a specific use of force rule and his “broader effort . . . to review [General McChrystal’s]
tactical directive limiting airstrikes”).
37. Noah Shachtman & Spencer Ackerman, 5,800 Attacks Are Just the Beginning After Petraeus’
Year-Long Air War, WIRED (Jul. 5, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/5800-attacks-arejust-the-beginning-after-petraeus-year-long-air-war/#more-50792.
38. SUSAN G. CHESSER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4108, AFGHANISTAN CASUALTIES: MILITARY
FORCES AND CIVILIANS 2–3 (June 9, 2011), http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=8855 (showing in a table the
civilian casualties in 2010 and January-May 2011 in Afghanistan). Regrettably, in February 2012 the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported that by the end of 2011, civilian casualties had
risen 8% over 2010. U.N. Assistance Mission to Afg., Afghanistan: Annual Report 2011, Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict 1, (Feb. 2012), http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/
UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012.pdf. The report attributes 77% of “conflictrelated” civilian deaths in 2011 to “Anti-Government Elements.” Id. The report also indicates that the
increased pace of air attacks that paralleled a reduction in the number of civilian deaths did not persist, as
it states that in 2011 there was a “reduced number of aerial operations.” Id. at 24. Aerial attacks were
responsible for just 187 of the 3,021 civilian deaths in 2011. Id. at 1, 24.
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and al-Qaeda, not the Coalition.39 Moreover, Coalition fatalities, which averaged
nearly sixty per month in 2010, fell in 2011.40
The logic of the Petraeus approach seems clear: by seizing the opportunity to
use airpower more liberally (but fully consonant with LOAC), fewer enemies
escaped. Since the enemy kills the overwhelming number of civilians, removing
more adversaries from the equation naturally reduces the peril to noncombatants. It
certainly serves no military or humanitarian purpose to create a de facto sanctuary
for Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters by a policy pronouncement that erodes the
underlying rationale for the law of war’s rule. In short, the numbers indicate that
increasing airstrikes actually decreases the number of civilian and military deaths. In
fact, a U.N. report released in March 2011 declared that “[a]lthough the number of
air strikes increased exponentially, the number of civilian casualties from air strikes
decreased in 2010.”41
To be sure, criticism of U.S. airstrikes continues, but the rationale may not be as
much about violating the law or even the deaths, per se. After all, a 2010 study found
that airstrikes were responsible for less than a sixth of all civilian deaths attributable
to Coalition actions.42 Indeed, traffic accidents with NATO vehicles killed more
Afghan women and children than did airstrikes.43 Rather, the criticism may be
something of a veiled protest against the presence of foreign ground troops.
Reporter Alissa Rubin remarked in the New York Times that even though the
Taliban and al-Qaeda cause the vast majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan,
“those that are caused by NATO troops appear to reverberate more deeply because
of underlying animosity about foreigners in the country.”44
When the law is well understood, and is informed by relevant cultural factors, it
is easier to parse the subtleties. In this instance, for example, if NATO’s desire was
to limit Afghan protests due to civilian deaths, then the better approach might have
been to limit the number of troops on the ground, not the airstrikes that kill those
doing most of the killing of civilians. Ironically, troops on the ground are related to
the civilian casualties that do occur from airstrikes. A study released by Human
Rights Watch in 2008 reported that the “vast majority of known civilian deaths”
caused by airstrikes came from those called in by ground forces under insurgent
attack.45 Following the law as outlined in the AMW Manual, as opposed to trying to

39. Jim Michaels, Taliban Behind Most Afghan Civilian Casualties, USA TODAY (June 22, 2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/2011-06-22-afghan-civilian-casualties_n.htm.
40. Coalition Military Fatalities By Year and Month, ICASUALTIES.ORG, http://icasualties.org/OEF/
Index.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (showing that Coalition casualties fell to 566 in 2011 from 711 in
2010).
41. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afg. & Afg. Indep. Human Rights Comm’n, Afghanistan: Annual
Report 2010, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 24 (Mar. 2011), http://unama.unmissions.org/
Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf.
42. Luke N. Condra et al., The Effect of Civilian Causalities in Afghanistan and Iraq 39, (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16152, 2010, revised 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w16152 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
43. Id.
44. Alissa J. Rubin, Afghan Leader Calls Apology in Boys’ Deaths Insufficient, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/world/asia/07afghanistan.html.
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “TROOPS IN CONTACT” AIRSTRIKES AND CIVILIAN DEATHS IN
AFGHANISTAN 29–30, (2008), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2008/afghanistan0908/afghanistan0908
web.pdf.
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“improve” upon it, is much more likely to produce the desired military and strategic
outcome.

II.

THE AMW MANUAL AND THE DOD MANUAL

The AMW Manual aims to apply to all nations, but in reality, accomplishing
that end is a profoundly challenging proposition. Afghanistan is a good example of
why this is true. Given that international law is comprised principally of treaties and
customary international law,46 the fact that not all Coalition partners may be parties
to the same international agreements can—and does—create complication in
Afghanistan.
Still, manuals such as the AMW Manual, along with its Commentary, are very
helpful in identifying relevant provisions of both sources; however, it is the
determination of customary international law that is, by far, the most problematic.
At the end of the day, it is principally state practice—at least with respect to the law
of armed conflict—that will define customary international law.47 It may be that
manuals can play a role in developing or even initiating state practice (and some
could understandably argue that the Lieber Code did just that), but they are not
themselves an independent source of customary international law.
Defining customary international law in the context of the law of war has
proven to be especially difficult. Indeed, I think that this will always be the rub with
law of armed conflict manuals: to what degree can nations agree with what is, in fact,
customary international law in that context? The United States, for example, has
sharply differed in the past with interpretations that the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and others have claimed for customary international law in
armed conflicts.48 In the case of the dispute with the ICRC, the United States took
most issue with the sources relied upon to determine customary international law,
and it seems clear that recitation of a particular principle in a law of war manual
would not be deemed sufficient.49
Obviously, the AMW Manual has to come to conclusions as to customary
international law, and in some instances those conclusions may prove to be at odds
with the U.S. interpretation. Exactly how much of a difference there may be is hard
to say, because the official U.S. government views are not as definitively elucidated
as one might hope. That, however, could change with the much-anticipated issuance
of the aforementioned U.S. DoD Law of War Manual, the drafting of which Hays
Parks oversaw for more than a decade prior to his retirement in 2010.50 I suspect that
much of it will be in agreement with the AMW Manual, but there could well be
important differences.

46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987).
47. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. para. 1b, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (stating
that the International Court of Justice shall apply, inter alia, “international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law”).
48. See, e.g., Jim Garamone, DoD, State Department Criticize Red Cross Law of War Study,
AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?
id=3308 (discussing criticism by lawyers in the DoD and the State Department of the methodology used in
an ICRC study purporting to be the “definitive explanation of the laws of war”).
49. Id.
50. See Parks, supra note 6, at 7–8 (describing the process of drafting the new manual).
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Unfortunately, it now appears that the issuance of the DoD Manual will be
delayed as the coordination with agencies outside the DoD apparently is taking
longer than expected.51 As the recent controversy over the legal status of air
operations against Libya illustrates, there are evidently serious divides within the
U.S. government legal community about some rather basic questions.52
The precise nature of the dispute may be unknown, but it is indeed worrisome
that a manual that was drafted principally by current and former military lawyers
(and peer-reviewed by world-renowned experts)53 might nevertheless be caught up in
policy quarrels. In a way, it is reminiscent of previous disputes between military and
civilian lawyers as to other law of war issues arising since 9/11.54 Regardless, this will
make the AMW Manual especially valuable, as it will fill, if not a lacuna in the law, a
lacuna in available manuals specializing in this aspect of warfare.
In any event, whenever the DoD Manual is finally published, its analysis of
customary international law will likely not be accepted by all, but it will reflect state
practice at least with respect to the United States. There are those who will say,
understandably, that U.S. practice does not, ipso facto, define state practice for the
purpose of defining customary international law. Yet in the area of air and missile
warfare especially, the U.S. view will doubtless be authoritative if not controlling.
The United States is, and will likely continue to be for the foreseeable future, the
foremost practitioner of air and missile warfare. In terms of actual warfighting
experience, there are a few nations with some current experience, but none with the
dimension of that of the United States. Moreover, the United States is—for now
anyway—the leader in air and missile technology.

III.

TECHNOLOGY, ROE, AND THE AMW MANUAL
PRACTITIONER

Along this line, allow me to observe that it has been my experience that with
respect to air and missile weapons, the erudition in the law of some commentators
and legal scholars is not always matched by a sophisticated understanding of the
weapons and delivery systems, not to mention the doctrine and strategies for their
use. This hobbles their analysis and, frankly, undermines the weight their views are
given by warfighters, who may consider their legal views too uninformed by the facts
to be useful.

51. This observation is based on the author’s conversations and correspondence with U.S.
Department of Defense attorneys and others with relevant knowledge.
52. Administration lawyers apparently could not agree as to whether or not U.S. involvement in
NATO’s combat operations over Libya constituted “hostilities” within the meaning of the War Powers
Resolution. Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html.
53. See Parks, supra note 6, at 7–8 (“The peer review consisted of senior military legal officers from
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; four U.S. law professors from top U.S. law
schools with extensive knowledge of the law of war; and Sir Adam Roberts, a distinguished British
professor of history with long-time interest in the law of war.”).
54. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Tale of Two Judges: A Judge Advocate’s Reflections on Judge
Gonzales’ Apologia, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 893, 894, 906–908 (2010) (describing the ideological conflicts
between then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s civilian “War Council” and JAG attorneys post-9/11).
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Without a great deal of technical acumen beyond the law, it is simply impossible
to be an effective legal advisor for U.S. air and missile operations, regardless of legal,
qua legal, expertise. Consider that such operations are typically controlled by
Combined Air and Space Operations Centers (CAOCs) that are “comprised of a
vast array of people, programs and processes” and filled with “thousands of
computers, dozens of servers, racks of video equipment and display screens.”55 Much
of this technology is directly relevant to efforts to comply with LOAC. For example,
U.S. News & World Report noted that in the CAOC:
Analysts calculate the size of bomb fragments and the distance they travel
from the strike site, using detailed maps and video footage to gauge
potential for human casualties and property damage. In another area,
analysts don 3D glasses to read maps that show precise heights of palm
trees and the walls of any given compound to help determine “collateral
concerns.”56
The New York Times also noted that:
The bombs themselves are chosen carefully and sometimes modified.
Some designed for air burst are instead programmed with a delayed fuse to
bury themselves before exploding, thus reducing the blast range. One sort
of bomb has even been loaded with less explosive, filled instead with
concrete, to cause great damage where it hits but no farther.57
As the Times further reported, Air Force lawyers “vet” the targets to ensure the
proposed bombing conforms to “a complex body of military law, including the
Geneva Conventions, acts of Congress and court decisions.”58 In order to perform
this duty, each of these lawyers had to be specially trained not just on the law of air
and missile warfare, but also on the systems utilized in the CAOC, as well as a vast
body of information concerning weapons, munitions, and the strategies for their use.
Absent such training, legal expertise from a manual or otherwise will be for
naught. It just cannot be emphasized enough how important it is for practitioners in
this area to thoroughly educate themselves on what may be viewed in traditional
terms as the clients’ “business.” This is vitally important, because absent such a
demonstrated understanding of the realities military commanders and their forces
face, effective legal advice that is accepted is difficult to attain. Mastery of the AMW
Manual (and even its Commentary) is not sufficient to minimally qualify an attorney
to serve as an air and missile operation legal advisor.
It is also important to understand that as valuable as the AMW Manual or any
other manual may be in ensuring that the basics of LOAC are observed, in U.S. air
operations today, the core document is what is called the special instructions
(SPINS), which include the rules of engagement (ROE).59 ROE are defined by the

55. Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC), U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, U.S. AIR
FORCES CENTRAL (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.afcent.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=12152.
56. Anna Mulrine, A Look Inside the Air Force’s Control Center for Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (May 29, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/05/29/a-look-inside-theair-forces-control-center-for-iraq-and-afghanistan.
57. Thom Shanker, Civilian Risks Curb Strikes in Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/asia/23military.html.
58. Id.
59. See U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate Gen. Corps, Rules of Engagement, in AIR FORCE
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DoD as “[d]irectives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or
Those
continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.”60
“circumstances and limitations” usually involve many more constraints than the law
would itself require. ROE incorporate myriad policy considerations that may, for
example, impose limitations on attacks in certain circumstances that are not
mandated by LOAC, or require out-of-theater approvals by high-ranking
government officials.
Put another way, in modern air and missile operations conducted by
experienced air powers, compliance with the minimum LOAC standards set forth in
the AMW Manual is not often a challenge; however, compliance with the ROE can
be. ROE can be complex because not all of the requirements are intuitive, and
policy decisions not implicating the law of war can change frequently. The United
States is not, of course, alone in having ROE so defined; most nations do, and the
policy directions they contain can be quite controversial.61 Although most coalition
operations seek to draft universally accepted ROE, in most circumstances nations
will retain one or more variances as a matter of national prerogative, or even because
of differing legal obligations based on those international agreements to which they
are—or are not—parties.

CONCLUSION
As noted in the beginning, the AMW Manual is a tremendous accomplishment,
one that will serve the relevant communities of interest—practitioners, operators,
policymakers, journalists, the general public, and more—for years to come. In fact, it
may not be possible to improve upon it very much because of the vagaries of the
acceptance of what is or is not customary international law, as well as emerging
theories that suggest the hitherto largely unheard of proposition that nations may be
able to withdraw from customary international law.62 International law, to include
the law of war, is in a very dynamic age.
It is important to understand that while the AMW Manual can provide a
baseline and its users can be assured that following it will not be “wrong” or create
criminal liability of some sort, it is not without controversy. Indeed, if there is a
criticism to be made, it may be that the AMW Manual is too conservative. The
controversy, such as it may be, could well focus more on the Commentary than on
the AMW Manual itself. Still, there are aspects of the AMW Manual not otherwise
incorporated into treaty law that may nevertheless rapidly become accepted
OPERATIONS & THE LAW 237 (2009) (“Most SPINS have an ROE subsection, which contains a copy of
relevant provisions of the applicable ROE . . . .”).
60. Rules of Engagement, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/r/6783.html.
61. See, e.g., Andy Bloxham, Soldiers Told Not to Shoot Taliban Bomb Layers, THE TELEGRAPH
(UK) (July 8, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/8626344/Soldiers-toldnot-to-shoot-Taliban-bomb-layers.html (discussing a controversial ROE policy barring British soldiers
from shooting insurgents planting roadside improvised explosive devices).
62. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.
J. 202, 204 (2010) (challenging the historical and functional underpinnings of the “Mandatory View” that
“nations never have the right to withdraw unilaterally” from a customary international law rule “once the
rule becomes established”).
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customary international law, with the Section S (Surrender) and Section U
(Contraband, Interception, Inspection and Capture)63 being excellent candidates for
early recognition.
This essay has tried to emphasize that to be an effective practitioner in this area
of the law requires much more knowledge than the AMW Manual can provide. The
effective counselor must bring to bear a broad range of knowledge—technical,
cultural, psychological, and more—all with a cognizance that it must resonate with
the clientele as a practical and pragmatic enabler of effective warfighting. With
respect to considerations beyond the law, per se, an American practitioner may wish
to note that the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provide: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only
to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political
factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”64
Though perhaps not conceived with the role of the lawyer in armed conflict in
mind, this provision promoting a holistic approach to client issues is nevertheless
especially relevant in modern air and missile warfare, where each operation is
subjected to relentless scrutiny by friend and foe alike. Much of that scrutiny has as
much to do with the wisdom of a particular act as its technical legality. The lawyer
must be prepared to advise on both, and that preparation can require a very
significant intellectual investment.
To be clear, the business of war can be quite demanding on those providing
legal advice; such advice has to be given the right way, and its wider effects must be
carefully considered. Recognizing the special nature of this kind of practice does not
come naturally to some lawyers. Professor Richard Schragger observed in discussing
the difference between military and civilian lawyers in the Bush Administration that:
[M]ilitary lawyers understand that when you ask human beings to kill other
human beings, rules of decency are required. . . . Instead of seeing law as a
barrier to the exercise of their clients’ power, [military lawyers] understand
the law as a prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of power. Law allows
our troops to engage in forceful, violent acts with relatively little hesitation
or moral qualms. Law makes just wars possible by creating a well-defined
legal space within which individual soldiers can act without resorting to
their own personal moral codes. 65
Thus, efforts like the drafting of the AMW Manual are but one part of the
overall preparation for lawful, ethical combat. The AMW Manual can be
instrumental not just to protecting the lives of innocent civilians, or even to
defending the perquisites of states, per se. It can also help to provide a degree of
confidence, if not comfort, to those who are asked by their nation to perform the
most difficult of tasks under the most demanding of circumstances. For this, if
nothing else, the enormous effort that produced the AMW Manual finds its
justification.

63. AMW MANUAL, supra note 2, paras. 125–31, 134–36.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010).
65. Richard C. Schragger, Cooler Heads: The Difference Between the President’s Lawyers and the
Military’s, SLATE (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.slate.com/id/2150050/?nav/navoa.

